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Abstract 
The paper explores the link between international economic 
integration and technological capability in colonial India. The 
example of iron industry shows that many new ideas and skills 
flowed into India from Europe, but not all met with commercial 
success. The essay suggests that in those fields in which the 
costs of complementary factors were relatively low, the chance of 
success was higher. This condition was present in the craft of the 
blacksmith, in which the main complementary input was 
craftsmanship. The condition was slow to develop in iron-
smelting, where the costs of fuel, labour, capital, and carriage of 
ore were high in the mid-nineteenth century. 
 
 
Did colonialism and globalization aid or obstruct industrial 
development in nineteenth century India?2 In historical scholarship, two 
models of the impact of globalization usually occur together to form what 
we may call the received view on this question. One of these draws a 
picture of an accelerated integration in commodity trade, and the other 
draws a picture of an obstructed or distorted integration in technological 
knowledge. The former model follows the neoclassical framework in 
suggesting that the first globalization imposed a new division of labour 
upon India, one that destroyed manufacturing and stimulated the 
                                            
1 The paper is accepted for publication in the Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, 47(1), January-March 2010. I have benefited greatly from detailed comments 
received from two readers of the journal. An earlier version of the paper was presented 
in the Economic History Seminar series, Carlos III University, Madrid. I wish to thank 
the participants in the seminar for a stimulating and productive discussion. 
2 I use ‘globalization’ in two senses – an historical process of rapidly increasing 
international transactions in commodity, labour, and capital that characterized the 
nineteenth century world, and a label that represents theoretical models developed to 
understand the effect of international economic integration upon world inequality. 
Colonialism in South Asia was an influential driver of market integration. 
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production and export of primary goods.3 By and large, the received view 
reads the growth implications of the pattern of change in a pessimistic 
vein, drawing a link between trade, ‘peasantization’, and 
underdevelopment.4 The second model deals with construction of 
knowledge, skill, and capability. In this view, the colonial state, 
deliberately or otherwise, obstructed the development of indigenous 
capability. In one strand, it did so by means of a preference for 
technological choices that favoured expatriate capital at the cost of 
domestic capital.5 In another, it did so by means of a biased system of 
education, the purpose of which ‘was not .. transfer of Western ideas and 
artefacts, but .. transfer of loyalties’, together with destruction of 
indigenous handicrafts, consequently weak market-based transfer of 
knowledge, and overall, the formation of an ‘enclavist’ industrial system.6 
The economic history of iron and steel production in India seems to 
illustrate the received view particularly well. Historical scholarship on iron 
is well-developed.7 Most contributors to this literature implicitly share a 
                                            
3 The best-known statement owes to Bagchi, ‘De-industrialisation in India’, and ‘De-
industrialisation in Gangetic Bihar’. 
4 The link between destruction of industry and world inequality figure in development 
and trade scholarship as well. One of the enduring links is the notion that 
manufacturing permits increasing returns to scale whereas agriculture leads to 
diminishing returns. A second link is the idea that agriculture is a weak engine of 
growth due to Engel’s law and terms-of-trade shocks. A third considers job-loss for 
skilled labour. See Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress; Krugman and Venables, 
‘Globalization and Inequality’; Wood and Ridao-Cano, ‘Skill, Trade, and International 
Inequality’. For stylized models of the historical roots of Indian poverty making use of 
de-industrialization, see Dutt, ‘Origins’ and Eswaran and Kotwal, Why Poverty Persists. 
An earlier influential contribution is Hymer and Resnick, ‘Model of an Agrarian 
Economy’. 
5 Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, p. 10. See also for interpretations in this vein, Baber, 
Science of Empire; Inkster, ‘Colonial and Neo-Colonial Transfers’. 
6 Inkster, ‘Colonial and Neo-Colonial Transfers’, p. 42; and Inkster, ‘Science, 
Technology and Imperialism’. 
7 Three of the four principal segments of the industry – artisans, foreign enterprise in 
smelting, and manufacture of pig iron by the Bessemer process – have received 
attention. See Bhattacharya, ‘Iron Smelters’, Biswas, ‘Iron and Steel’, Roy, ‘Knowledge 
and Divergence’, Rungta, Rise of Business Corporations, Headrick, Tentacles of 
Progress, on the first two spheres of enterprise; and Bagchi, Private Investment, Ray, 
Industrialization, and Morris, ‘Growth of Large-scale Industry’, on the third. 
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point of view holding that a traditional industry died out due to foreign 
competition, there was loss of indigenous knowledge as a result, and the 
modern industry using western knowledge experienced a difficult start 
because of obstacles posed by the colonial state.8 Modern 
industrialization, in this view, became possible when the imperial 
government reversed its obstructive stance out of political self-interest. 
By gathering primary material so far under-utilized in the 
scholarship, and by drawing a contrast between iron-making and 
hardware, the present paper offers a different understanding of the effect 
of economic integration on the iron industry. The interest of the paper is 
mainly in the nineteenth century, when European artisans and traded 
machinery exerted a visible influence on indigenous manufacturing 
practices. The paper shows that the iron industry saw both failed and 
successful cases of knowledge transfer. These failures and successes 
were not connected with the policies of the state, but with conditions of 
factor markets. 
The alternative story consists of three propositions. First, in 
common with many other artisanal industries, in iron, destruction was 
pronounced in input manufacture (smelting) and subdued in final 
consumer goods (blacksmiths). In the latter case, significant instances of 
successful knowledge transfer can be found. Second, as one would 
expect in an industry in which early modern Western Europe had an 
acknowledged lead, there was translocation of artisanal knowledge of 
iron-making, mainly via migration of artisans. This process created 
knowledge about Indian iron in the public domain that contributed to the 
                                                                                                                                
Partahsarathi, ‘Iron-smelting’ contains an overview of both traditional and modern 
enterprise in the nineteenth century. The fourth segment, blacksmiths, has not been 
the subject of a detailed historical study yet. 
8 On the centrality of colonial political attitudes as a factor behind the delayed start of a 
modern iron and steel industry in India, see Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, pp. 295-
6. On the point of loss of knowledge, see Parthasarathi, ‘Iron-smelting’. 
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success of later modern firms. However, in most instances, translocation 
ended in commercial failure. 
Third, both the success of knowledge transfer (blacksmiths), and 
the lack of success of knowledge transfer (smelters), can be explained 
with reference to a single set of variables, cost of complementary inputs. 
Technological choices take place within a context set by conditions of 
factor markets. Successful adoption of a new idea requires the costs of 
complementary inputs to be relatively low. In iron smelting, the principal 
complementary inputs were wood fuel, ore, and transportation. All of 
these costs were high in nineteenth century India, and rising in some 
cases. Mining and mass transportation were relatively undeveloped, and 
costly because of the terrain. Charcoal was becoming dearer. Even 
labour costs turned out to be high for the smelters, due to insufficient 
growth of a labour market. With blacksmiths, however, the only major 
complementary input was skilled craftsmanship, which could be found in 
abundance in India. Much knowledge came in embodied in cheap tools, 
which were quickly adopted and reproduced. Whereas large-scale 
smelting was a relatively capital-intensive process, smithy was not. And 
therefore, cost of capital mattered little in this sphere. 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section 
takes a brief tour of the relevant historiography, and proposes that the 
interpretation of iron history developed here can be generalized to other 
industries, and is more consistent with concepts of globalization in 
economic theory and economic history. The other two sections deal with 
the smelters and smiths, respectively. The last section offers concluding 
observations and returns to the question the paper opens with. 
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Historiography 
The motivation for the paper derives from some recent research on 
artisans that advance a more differentiated narrative of globalization than 
the received view allows for. This scholarship acknowledges that mass 
produced inputs such as cotton yarn suffered a quick substitution of 
handmade for imported machine-made product in the nineteenth century. 
But it points out that handloom weaving saw extensive survival in spite of 
the fact that imported cloth cost much less to buy. The survival is 
explained with reference to two factors. On the demand side, product 
differentiation, consumption preferences in clothing, and the availability of 
highly skilled craftsmanship allowed handloom weavers to continue 
making non-standard goods for consumer markets. On the supply side, 
importation of artisanal technologies embodied in tools, machines and 
processes, reduced costs of production, increased productivity, and 
enhanced economies of scope.9 
The textile example not only qualifies the received view, but also 
connects better with current interpretations of globalization within 
economic theory and history. In the spirit of trade theories that emphasize 
the role of product differentiation, it is possible to suggest that 
differentiation and consumer preference sustained demand for specific 
skills, including artisanal skills.10 The impact of imported machine-made 
goods was destructive upon generic industrial inputs; and muted, at times 
creative, upon the manufacture of non-standard niche-market 
consumption articles, especially those that demanded some form of 
craftsmanship. And in the spirit of new theories of growth, the revision 
proposes that knowledge spillover occurred in the course of integration in 
                                            
9 Some of the most important tools and processes adopted by the weavers in late-
colonial India, such as the fly-shuttle sley, the frame-mounted loom, the jacquard, 
dobby, drop-box, and synthetic dyes, had been invented in Europe between the late 
eighteenth and the late nineteenth centuries. Roy, Traditional Industry, and 
‘Acceptance of Innovations’, contain a statement and some illustrations. 
10 Krugman, ‘Scale Economies’. 
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factor markets, and that, if knowledge exchange and domestic capability 
conflicted in some fields, there were also fields wherein they were 
compatible.11 
Economic history, which shares with new theories of growth an 
interest in knowledge, discusses four processes by which globalization 
creates capability across national borders: migration of skilled individuals, 
foreign investment, state and institutional intervention, and trade in 
machinery.12 In the early modern world, mobile knowledge relied mainly 
on migration of skilled artisans.13 In the postwar world, the multinational 
company and partnership between domestic business and the 
developmental state keen to direct private technological choices have 
played large roles.14 In the time spanned by these two regimes, the main 
channel of knowledge transfer was trade in machinery. In the case of 
nearly all examples of ‘late’ industrialization founded upon a cotton textile 
mill industry, the nineteenth century beginning saw importation of 
machinery and the foremen to operate these, and the interwar maturation 
                                            
11 Grossman and Helpman, ‘Trade, Innovation, and Growth’. 
12 The historical literature on large-scale technological transformation also deals with 
motivations for choice, the diffusion dynamic, and the contents of a package that get 
chosen. On factor costs as motivation, see Ruttan and Hayami, ‘Technology Transfer’. 
The particular role of communication networks and urban clusters in knowledge 
transfer is explored in another literature, see, for example, Nelson, ‘Less Developed 
Countries’, Wright, ‘Can a Nation Learn?’ 
13 Epstein, ‘Craft Guilds’, and ‘Property Rights’. Artisan migration as an adjunct to state 
formation and state decay in early modern India is studied in Haynes and Roy, 
‘Conceiving Mobility’. Artisan migration was important before the Industrial Revolution 
because machines themselves were simple in construction, foreign investment was 
insignificant, and artisanal knowledge was embodied in the experience and 
conventions of skilled masters. Within Western Europe, organized attempts to copy 
and steal ideas were also present in the eighteenth century, when practical knowledge 
became one front among many along which the political and military rivalry among 
states was conducted, see Harris, Industrial Espionage. 
14 The impact of such transfer is linked with both domestic capacity to absorb, and 
imperfections in the market for knowledge. On discussions of the relevant literature, 
and pessimistic as well as optimistic case studies, see Teece, ‘The Market for Know-
How’; Mohanan Pillai and Subrahmanian, ‘Rhetoric and Reality’; Kojima, Direct Foreign 
Investment; Stiglitz, ‘Some Lessons’. A branch of comparative management explores 
cultural variables that impinge on capacity to absorb foreign technology, Kedia and 
Bhagat, ‘Cultural Constraints’. 
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saw import-substitution in personnel, machines, and spare parts. In 
addition to these market-mediated channels, in India, the imperial 
connection facilitated state-mediated knowledge transfers as well; the 
major instances studied include the stationary steam engine, the 
telegraph, engineering education, and the railways.15 
The meanings historians of India draw from these examples vary, 
however. Railways greatly reduced costs of bulk transportation. Did it also 
foster knowledge transfer? In one view, the buy-British policy followed in 
the procurement of railway rolling stock in the prewar phase restricted the 
backward linkages of railway development.16 In a more positive view, the 
spillovers of railways were significant, if not on equipment, on 
construction; and they were increasing, as the British standards were 
modified in favour of the more practicable Indian ones.17 The cotton 
textile mill industry was built with the help of Lancashire machinery, 
technical manpower, and standards. Persistence with British standards 
has been seen in one interpretation to have led to a dysfunctional r
in spinning in the late nineteenth century.
egime 
e 
                                           
18 On the other hand, the clos
contact between Bombay mills and Lancashire machines also enabled a 
quick and successful diversification into weaving in response to this 
problem. As I mentioned above, import substitution in machinery, parts, 
and manpower occurred too. The ‘Indianization’ of the cotton mill 
supervisory staff in the interwar period represents a successful and 
somewhat under-researched case of capability building.19 Such cases 
 
15 Headrick, Tentacles of Progress; Inkster, ‘Colonial and Neo-colonial Transfers’; and 
Baber, Science of Empire; on the railways; Tann and Aitken, ‘Diffusion of the Stationary 
Steam Engine’; Ambirajan, ‘Science and Technology Education’; Kumar, ‘Colonial 
Requirements’, Ghose, ‘Commercial Needs’. See also several essays and the 
introduction in MacLeod and Kumar, eds., Technology and the Raj. 
16 Inkster, ‘Colonial and Neo-Colonial Transfers’.  
17 Derbyshire, ‘The Building of India’s Railways’. 
18 See Tripathi, ‘Colonialism and Technology Choices’, for a discussion of this view. 
19 Between the first origins of cotton mills in Bombay, and 1925, the percentage of 
Europeans among the supervisory staff decreased from 100 per cent to less than 30 
per cent. See Morris, ‘Recruitment’. 
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were not numerous. A recent survey of technological choices in private 
manufacturing attributes conservative decisions and the restrained 
manner in which capability building occurred to risk aversion, rather than 
the actions of the state.20 
If we consider these examples collectively, globalization would 
seem to have had a mixed and differentiated effect on Indian industrial 
capability. Commodity and technology flows weakened some traditional 
occupations, foreclosed some potentially beneficial choices, and 
strengthened other spheres of operation by stimulating learning and 
expanding choices. The present paper is an attempt to read the history of 
the iron industry in colonial India in order to develop a broader 
understanding of why the impact of globalization was necessarily 
variegated. 
The textile example hints at a reason why it was. Handloom 
weavers, protected by market segmentation, gained from globalization 
because new knowledge augmented an already rich resource, their craft 
skills. In the case of cotton mills, the cost of cotton was unassailably low 
in India, costs of machinery were brought down via integration of Indian 
port cities with the British economy especially after the Suez Canal 
opened, and costs of capital were kept manageable by institutional 
means adopted by merchant communities. New knowledge could attain 
success here. In short, the nature of the impact varied according to costs 
and availability of other factors of production. Iron illustrates this very 
point. 
 
 
Artisanal Smelting 
In the prelude to the Industrial Revolution, iron-making developed 
in contact with the principal user industries. In early modern England and 
                                            
20 Tripathi, ‘Colonialism and Technology Choices’. 
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Wales, clusters of bloomery located near sources of fuel and ore served 
water-powered forge shops in the neighbourhood. They supplied 
agricultural tools, construction material, consumer articles, and machine 
parts. Eventually, ore was imported from overseas. In India, in contrast, 
iron-making retained its links with the mining of ore, and concentrated in 
regions that had supplies of iron ore and charcoal occurring together. But 
these regions did not usually have large and diversified hardware 
industries, or a concentration of diverse users.21 This close contact 
between occurrence of ore and smelting imposed certain characteristics 
upon the conduct of the industry. 
First, the average furnaces in early nineteenth century India were 
small in capacity relative to those in early modern England and parts of 
western Europe. The actual furnace size varied between regions within 
India, but even the largest did not reach 100 tons. In the 1630s, an 
average furnace in the Midlands made 350-400 tons of finished iron 
annually.22 The largest furnaces in India were located in Malabar, and 
were, if operated at full capacity, capable of 90 tons of sponge iron.23 In 
1838, an average furnace of permanent construction in western India 
manufactured about 16 tons of wrought iron each. Some of the 
permanent furnaces in Birbhum in eastern India were capable of 
producing 34 tons of sponge iron, or 24 tons of bar iron.24 The capacity of 
the semi-permanent furnaces commonly set up in central, eastern, and 
northern India was smaller, and rarely exceeded 2 tons of wrought iron a 
                                            
21 The major published sources on the economic side of the industry between 1800 and 
1865 are Buchanan, Journey, Heyne, Tracts, and Percy, Metallurgy. 
22 Hammersley, ‘The Charcoal Iron Industry’. 
23 Biswas, ‘Iron and Steel’. Buchanan contains descriptions of ironworks in many 
places in Mysore and Malabar, Journey. The Mysore descriptions have a repetitive 
quality. In the majority of the works, a team of 10-15 workers operated smelting shops, 
the team sometimes included charcoal makers and forge operators. The net output, 
which consisted of agricultural tools, was shared between the members. There is 
frequent mention of a headman or a skilled artisan who received the largest part. The 
person was usually the one in charge of erecting the furnace. 
24 Estimated by Thomas Oldham in 1852, reported in Gupta, Rarher Samaj, p. 263. 
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year, given the extremely small output per charge.25 One authority 
observes that a permanent furnace in Birbhum that employed 100 
persons might produce half a ton of bar iron per person.26 The actual 
average should be higher, for many of these workers were employed 
part-time. Elsewhere, I have assumed an average output per person of 4 
tons of wrought iron a year, to estimate possible production levels in the 
early nineteenth century.27 The number is a plausible one.28 The true 
average cannot be precisely estimated because the relationship between 
labour-intensity and furnace size is unclear. It cannot be substantially 
higher, however, for in the mid-nineteenth century, by far the more 
common type was the semi-permanent furnace. 
Second, evidence of long-distance maritime trade in iron goods 
remains scarce. The few references available in the early modern period 
yield a low figure for export, not exceeding a few tons.29 Equally scarce 
are references to an extensive inland trade in ores. Charcoal, being 
brittle, is not a good material for long distance trade. There is mention of a 
trade in ores and bar iron in Birbhum, but it was conducted by small-scale 
itinerant operators confined in a small region.30 The infrequent 
                                            
25 Buchanan reported that in a larger work in Mysore, one furnace was capable of 
producing bar iron of 11 lbs. per day, or 1.6-1.9 tons per year. At a time, three furnaces 
were at work, which employed 22 workers in all. The majority of these workers were 
part-timers, Journey, pp. 16-7. In 1906, six small iron mines in Garhwal produced 3.5 
tons of pig iron, Dobbs, Monograph, p. 11; About 1900 in central India, the output of 
200-250 semi-permanent furnaces was estimated at 400 tons of refined iron. The 
average annual output of a furnace did not exceed 2.4 to 3 tons of crude iron, Begbie, 
Monograph, p. 32. 
26 Gupta, Rarher Samaj, p.253. According to this work, one charge took seven days, 
and produced 20 maunds of iron with 100 workers. 
27 Roy, ‘Knowledge and Divergence’. 
28 The number is equivalent to a team of five members erecting a makeshift furnace ten 
times a year. These are reasonable parameters to assume for the semi-nomadic iron 
smelting industry. 
29 Biswas, ‘Iron and Steel’. 
30 The maximum distance reportedly covered was about 180 miles to the north, the 
location of Monghyr town. From Monghyr, traders came to Birbhum to purchase raw 
material for the town’s famous gun-making industry, Gupta, Rarher Samaj, p. 262. An 
1852 exploration of the Kharagpur hills south of Monghyr discovered that in this 
inaccessible region, ‘a tolerable quantity of iron is smelted.., generally in the jungle for 
10 
 
occurrence of trade can be explained with reference to the enormous cost 
of carriage that would have to be paid for any ore taken from the ma
source regions. An 1830s article urging European capitalists to settle in 
the out-of-the-way Khasi hills and make iron using local resources, 
mentioned that transportation accounted for two-third of the final price 
iron ore sold only a short distance away.
in 
of 
 
In 
s 
ere is 
 
                                                                                                                               
31 Third, possibly because a 
large market for ore could not be found, mining of ore occurred on a small 
scale, on the surface, and frequently by the smelters. All of these would
point to the close contact that smelting maintained with ore regions. 
turn, the smelters supplied a market located within close proximity, 
usually for agricultural tools. The smelter-cum-smith recruited workers 
from a few families, and did not target markets that could offer economie
of scale, such as, construction, shipping, and machinery. Fourth, th
a surprising lack of evidence suggesting inter-regional exchange in
technological knowledge. The major centres of the industry appear to 
have been self-contained knowledge worlds, with the result that a large 
dispersion in furnace type and size persisted until the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, when all the segments of indigenous iron-making 
were in decline. 
The exception to this pattern was crucible steel connected with 
weaponry, which was an urban industry that served an urban clientele. 
This industry mainly used wrought iron to make steel, and did not usually 
make iron from ore. Similarly, sword polishers used recycled old material. 
Both groups depended on traded material and served relatively rich 
buyers. By the most generous estimate, the net demand for crucible steel 
due to weaponry could not exceed a few hundred tons a year.32 Although 
 
the sake of being near the spot where the charcoal is burned.’ The smelters operate 
‘the rudest of furnaces and exchange the metal with the lowlanders for salt, tobacco, or 
rice.’ Sherwill, ‘Kurrukpore Hills’. 
31 Watson, ‘Chirra Punji’. 
32 I base this proposition on plausible conjectures about the size of armies, the average 
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specialized, it was this article that commanded the greatest curiosity 
among European observers in the late eighteenth century.33 
Snapshots of the domestic artisanal manufacture of iron in the 
nineteenth century suggest a predominance of semi-nomadic itinerant 
communities who performed smelting in the ore regions. Groups such as 
these tended to be itinerant for two reasons, charcoal had to be procured 
from a wide area. And being sometimes blacksmiths themselves, their 
market was dispersed over many villages. An interesting description of 
‘the Taremook, or wandering blacksmith’, of unspecified provenance 
within the Deccan, occurs in a mid-nineteenth century report on 
communities that were usually migratory. They travelled in groups of 
families, settled on the outskirts of a large village for a few months, 
performed smelting and iron-work, and were not known to own land.34 
Descriptions in the second half of the nineteenth century suggest a 
somewhat more sedentary character of the industry. The people who 
called themselves Agaria in central India, Aguriah in eastern India, and 
the Lohars of western, central and northern India were ordinarily engaged 
in iron. Some members of these communities worked as smelters as well 
as smiths.35 Elsewhere, they were integrated in the peasant village.36 The 
village Lohar was paid by an allowance of grain. Many Lohars also 
cultivated land. By and large these village smelters-cum-smiths fashioned 
their own tools of the trade.37 In some cases, mining was done by a 
                                                                                                                                
weight of steel carried per person, and a stock-flow ratio. 
33 Pearson, ‘Experiments and Observations’; Mushet, ‘Experiments on Wootz’; and the 
influential study by Stodart and Faraday, ‘On the Alloys of Steel’. 
34 Balfour, ‘Migratory Tribes’. 
35 They would take the blooms, ‘move about from village to village with an anvil, a 
hammer and tongs, and building a small furnace under a tree, make and repair iron 
implements for the villagers’, Russell and Hira Lal, Tribes and castes, p. 10. A later 
anthropological study of the Agarias has attained the status of a classic, Elwin, The 
Agaria. 
36 In Bundelkhand, the smelters were also Lohars or smiths by caste. Dobbs, 
Monograph, p. 13. 
37 The reti, or the file, ‘is often the only tool he has not made himself’, Ibid., p. 3. 
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distinct group of people. However, there is evidence also of the smelters 
mining iron themselves, especially among the Agarias. In nineteenth 
century ethnographic material, we also come across rural smelting 
communities that claimed to have descended from a tradition of sword-
making.38 But such instances were rare. 
The world of indigenous artisanal smelting declined after the entry 
of Swedish and British iron in India in the nineteenth century. The decline, 
however, was a protracted one. Until the railway network became 
sufficiently dense, engineers in the army and in the civil departments 
sometimes procured locally made iron to ‘work up into tools, straps, bolts, 
&c.’.39 As the railways spread into the interior, the practice stopped. 
Beginning with heavier goods such as complete iron roofs and bridges, 
and pig iron, imports diversified into goods that competed with domestic 
products directly.  
In the middle of the nineteenth century, iron blooms used by the 
north Indian Lohar came from the Central Provinces. In 1908, imported 
bar iron had completely replaced the local raw material. Local iron-
making, such as the early nineteenth century enterprises observed by 
Thomas Oldham, maintained only ‘a precarious existence’ in the hills and 
had disappeared from the plains.40 The country smelter ‘usually has his 
fields and only devotes a fraction of his time to his craft.’41 The soft iron 
used by the Kanpur Lohars was called suli, ‘the word is thought by some 
people to be a corruption of Swedish’. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
there were 160 furnaces in the Bhandara region of central India. There 
                                            
38 At the end of the nineteenth century in Bundelkhand could be found a nomadic 
community of blacksmiths, who ‘at certain seasons migrate from Rajputana .. wander 
about from place to place with their families, goods, and chattels’, and forged 
ploughshares for a fee. According to community lore, they had left Chittore when that 
city fell to the Mughals, vowing never to return until Chittore was liberated with the 
swords that they would themselves make and sell to the prospective liberators. Dobbs, 
Monograph, p. 5. 
39 Medley, India and Indian Engineering, p. 59. 
40 Dobbs, Monograph, p. 8. 
41 Ibid., p. 4. 
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were scarcely any left in 1908.42 In iron areas that were located far away 
from the railway line, a few furnaces continued to function, sometimes 
sponsored by the zamindars in whose territory the mines occurred and 
who were the main buyers of the goods. The relationship between the 
zamindars and the smelters was not a happy one, however. The more 
opportunities there were for trade, the keener was the zamindar to 
squeeze the smelter. Falling custom pushed the earnings of the semi-
nomadic iron-makers of Gond and Agaria origin to very low levels. When 
fully employed, they hoped to earn an income that was lower than the 
average wage of the agricultural labourer.43 The relatively larger-scale 
workshops of Southern India and those of Birbhum suffered an earlier 
and quicker decline, almost certainly due to scarcity of wood fuel.  
The obvious reason for decline was that the cost of Indian iron had 
been too high. About 1900, the average price of country iron per ton 
(based on six samples from Santal Parganas, Bundelkhand, Bhandara, 
Chhattisgarh, Garhwal, and Konkan) was Rs. 187. And the average of 
two samples of iron of English manufacture Rs. 131.44 The price 
difference between domestic and imported iron had been wide in the 
eighteenth century as well.45 In these times, the difference could not 
reflect relative levels of mechanization. Both knowledge worlds relied 
fundamentally on manual labour, charcoal, and bloomery type furnace. 
And yet, mainly due to differences in scale, labour productivity was low, 
and the cost of conversion of ore into finished iron, as well as energy-
intensity, were high in India. An exact measure of relative labour 
productivity cannot be constructed, not least because many Indian 
smelters were part-time workers. I have discussed above the very small 
                                            
42 Begbie, Monograph, pp. 4-5, 17. 
43 Ibid., p. 28. 
44 Dobbs, Monograph, p. 11; Begbie, Monograph, p. 26; Allen, ‘International 
Competition’; Scudamore, Monograph, p. 6. 
45 Roy, ‘Knowledge and Divergence’. 
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capacity of the average furnace. Nineteenth century observers familiar 
with European practice noted ‘the immense disproportion between the 
time and labour expended and the out-turn’ of iron in such small furnaces 
in India.46 In seventeenth century England, the average quantity of 
charcoal used was 2.5 loads per ton of pig iron.47 Taking a load to 
measure approximately 15 cwt of charcoal, we get a charcoal-iron ratio of 
1.9:1. In the mid-nineteenth century, the most efficient artisanal iron-
making in Europe, the Swedish forge, turned out a ratio of 1.3:1, and the 
least efficient, the Catalan forge, 7:1.48 Traditional smelting in 
Bundelkhand, based on a description of a mid-nineteenth century source, 
used a charcoal-iron ratio of approximately 8:1.49 In the forests of Chota 
Nagpur, the ratio was about 5.3:1.50 In Bhandara region of central India, 
the ratio was 6.3:1.51 Likewise, the standard ore-bar conversion ratio of 8-
10:1 compared poorly with European averages.52 
In addition to higher conversion cost to begin with, the Indian 
smelter had to contend, like charcoal-iron makers elsewhere, with rising 
cost of fuel.53 Where forests had once been plentiful, they were either 
beginning to become scarce or protected. When British rule began in the 
Kumaon Himalayas, iron mines were in existence in the Ramgarh region. 
Bishop Heber was informed in 1824 that a good deal of iron ore was 
found in the neighbourhood of Almorah, ‘which the inhabitants of the 
small village were employed in washing from its grosser impurities, and 
fitting it to be transported to Almorah for smelting.’54 In the 1820s, the 
headman of a community called Agaris had taken a lease to work all the 
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mines in the region. It appears that most of these works were abandoned, 
and the Agaris left the region when easily transportable charcoal ran out 
of supply. From the 1860s, the central Indian Lohar had to pay a large fee 
to the Forest Department. Oldham estimated that 40 furnaces in the 
Nimar district drew their fuel supplies from 350 square miles of forest. The 
number is possibly an overestimate, for elsewhere, we find a figure of 30 
acres for one furnace. Still, the enormity of the charcoal constraint can be 
gauged from these numbers. Not surprisingly, ‘the lohars complain that 
charcoal grows dearer and dearer.’55 
Much before the decline of indigenous smelting became 
pronounced, another form of artisanal iron-making was trying to establish 
itself in India. In the nineteenth century, artisan-entrepreneurs having 
some connection with the East India Company tried to erect viable iron 
shops after the English model. They were driven by a conception of 
comparative advantage that was not totally unrealistic. In this view, ‘they 
have labour cheap, and they have abundance of ore cheap, but they want 
skill and capital.’56 These entrepreneurs expected that with a change in 
scale they could bring down average costs substantially. 
Despite the mention of ‘capital’ in this citation, these individuals 
were far from capitalists. They were artisans brought up in the British 
tradition. In this respect, they fit the flow of migrant artisans and labourer 
from Britain to India better than the foreign investment that went into tea, 
jute, and indigo, in the same time. Migration of European artisans to India 
had begun in the eighteenth century.57 Thousands more travelled to India 
to make a career after the end of the Company’s charter in 1813. A 
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substantial number was absorbed in the army, the railways, and the 
government, but many others joined jobs that demanded skills then 
unavailable in India, as teachers, lawyers, and artisans. Unfortunately, the 
precise scale and composition of European migration cannot be 
measured with certainty. At 1860, the three Presidency towns together 
had a population of about 15,000 European males of working age, not 
including Europeans in the army. Only a handful would count as 
administrative workers, the majority worked in industry and services.58 
Among those employed in the army and the railways were numerous 
engineers. 
The settlers themselves gave rise to a market for ‘carriages, 
furniture of all kinds, palankeens of a peculiar construction, invented by 
the Europeans, plate, sadlery, boots and shoes, salting meats, in making 
guns and pistols, and a variety of other articles’, which included watch-
making, silverware, and glassware. In the eighteenth century, this 
demand had stimulated the trade in manufactured goods imported from 
Britain.59 ‘A great number of European artisans .. established themselves 
in Calcutta, in Patna, at all our cantonments at Lucknow’ to produce these 
goods. Tanneries, glass-works, casting and forging shops and carpentry 
workshops were established in large numbers. In Calcutta, Madras, and 
Bombay could be found ‘British artisans and manufacturers of almost 
every description of trade that is exercised in [Britain]: such as 
coachmakers, carpenters, cabinetmakers, upholsterers, workers in the 
different metals, workers in all kinds of tanned leather, tailors, and 
shoemakers’.60 These members of a European underclass were far 
removed from the governing elite, and routinely married Indian women. In 
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turn, ‘many of the half-cast, or children of European fathers and native 
mothers are employed in such trades’.61 In Calcutta, a ‘very large 
shipbuilder’ in the 1820s, Kid or Kyd, was of ‘half-caste’ origin.62 
Some of these adventurers, including Andrew Duncan and Josiah 
Marshall Heath, had been iron-masters. 
A Scottish iron-master, Andrew Duncan worked for more than 15 
years in Scotland and Russia, before arriving in Bengal in 1810.63 He was 
engaged by the Company to carry out a survey and prepare a report on 
the prospects of finding iron in Midnapore and Balasore, and construct a 
smelting shop and a foundry, on the promise of a sale contract with the 
Government. His survey took him to Birbhum, where a considerable iron 
industry then existed, and where he set up an experimental smelting 
shop. When the landlords discovered that Duncan was not a government 
employee, they ‘left nothing within their power undone to thwart and 
defeat my purposes’. His workers were bribed or coerced away, and his 
buildings destroyed. Despite such troubles, he managed to produce some 
iron in the next seven months. 
The Birbhum experiment taught Duncan that the main obstacle to 
setting up a large-scale workshop was workers. Duncan found it 
impossible to secure workers willing to learn how to operate the machines 
that he had brought with himself. The problem inclined him towards a 
location where European foremen would be more easily available, though 
Duncan still contemplated employing and training a mainly Indian work-
force. Further, he appeared to have dropped the idea of a smelting shop. 
He was authorised on government expense to erect a foundry on the 
confluence of the Mayurakshi and Hughly rivers in 1812. In 1814, when 
the building was completed, Fort William had second thoughts and 
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appointed a committee of engineers to assess the project. The 
committee’s report stated that Duncan was a good ironmaster but a bad 
accountant, and had underestimated the cost of transporting ore to this 
spot, Bigpore, and overestimated the cost of importing unwrought and 
cast iron. Nevertheless, Duncan was asked to start manufacturing. The 
subsequent history of the enterprise is not clear. The factory possibly 
manufactured a few shells. But there is no mention of a substantial body 
of workers being employed here. One of the last pieces of official 
correspondence on this enterprise sought instructions from Fort William 
concerning the bullocks procured to transport material. The promise of a 
historic career having ended, the bullocks spent their last days at the 
Commissariat slaughterhouse. 
The best documented modern venture in smelting was the Porto 
Novo factory.64 Porto Novo (Parangipettai) was a one-time port used by 
Dutch, French and English ships, and a small town located on the north 
bank of the Vellar river where the river meets the Bay of Bengal. Here, in 
1825, Josiah Marshall Heath, a Company servant, sought permission to 
set up an iron-making factory ‘embracing the process of smelting, 
puddling, and beating out into bars’.65 Heath’s demand was an exclusive 
lease of ores occurring in the region for the legally maximum time for 
such lease, 21 years. The grant of an exclusive license drew a 
threatening response from George Jessop, who had successfully 
established with his brother a foundry in Calcutta (that lives on today as a 
state enterprise).66 On the other hand, Heath received the backing of 
Thomas Munro, and along with him, a powerful section of Madras 
administration. 
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The factory would produce 4000 tons of bar iron, at a cost of £12 
per ton. The price of English pig iron was £8.3 per ton at this time. In 
Heath’s license application, the price of bar iron was set at £34-40 per ton 
in England and £18-24 in India, both figures appear exaggerated. In both 
markets, Heath managed to convince the concerned Company officers, 
his enterprise would make profit. The enterprise was troubled from the 
start. Heath soon found himself in debt to the Calcutta agency house, 
Alexander and Co., to the extent of Rs. 100,000 for the property 
purchased in Porto Novo and needed a large loan from the Company to 
proceed. The Porto Novo Iron Works also raised capital in Madras, by 
persuading Company surgeons and the Advocate-General in charge of 
drawing up the contract, to become shareholders. It does not appear that 
it managed to pay either dividend or interest at any time. By 1840, the 
company was hopelessly in debt. 
As late as 1849, a memorandum by the Accountant General stated 
that ‘the causes of the total failure of the undertaking are at present 
inexplicable’.67 While the iron was high priced, lack of demand was not 
the reason for failure. Although the first batches of pig iron supplied from 
Porto Novo to England failed to pass the test of quality, the problem was 
eventually sorted out.  About 1850, Sheffield imported a small quantity of 
Indian pig iron. In an estimated annual consumption of 35,000-40,000 
tons, Indian production, almost all of it from Porto Novo, supplied a 
quantity slightly less than 1000 tons, a small proportion, but large enough 
in volume to draw attention. In this market, Porto Novo iron was known for 
superior quality. Heath’s own statement after he returned to England in 
1837 complained about the lack of cooperation in Sheffield; about the fact 
that his goods did not find market in India, and that the Government 
refused to respond to his call for marketing contract.68 In Sheffield, 
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however, a different perception prevailed. Heath’s problem was not 
demand, not quality, nor the price, but inelastic scale. Sheffield, in fact, 
wanted more of Heath’s iron, considered unequal for steel tools, but 
Heath ‘indignantly rejected’ the offer of a contract to supply a larger and 
steady volume. ‘The fact was, he knew he could not do it.’69 The problem 
was on the supply side. 
In current scholarship, the explanation of why Porto Novo failed 
remains conjectural, and therefore, not always persuasive. One work 
suggests that the enterprise suffered from capital shortage.70 The 
interpretation would be convincing, but for the fact that the company was 
in debt to the tune of nearly a million rupees when it ended. The very 
prospect of dragging on for twenty years with other peoples’ money 
discounts capital shortage as the critical factor in its demise. In this time, 
venture capital could be raised, even though the negotiation costs were 
sometimes quite high, by taking recourse to London, the Company, or 
Calcutta agency houses. An earlier study surveyed a few other examples 
of failed European adaptation of indigenous smelting processes, and 
attributed the failure to incompatibility between indigenous work 
organization and the scale of the new enterprise.71 It is true that the two 
knowledge orders were too far apart and too incompatible to develop 
working partnerships. However, what we want to know is how this factor 
made a difference to actual operation of a factory such as Porto Novo. I 
would argue that the main supply problems in this case were posed by 
the costs of labour and materials. The reason the government did not 
support the enterprise as much as Heath had hoped for was the 
persistent failure to reduce these costs. 
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A report conducted in 1833 stressed the importance of ‘steady 
intelligent workmen’ and steady supply of charcoal to make the enterprise 
a success.72 Another report in 1837 was more candid, ‘the persons in 
immediate charge of the machinery at Porto Novo appear to have been 
not educated men, but merely working artificers.’ ‘The fundamental defect 
of there being no competent engineer’ contributed to the delayed 
commissioning of the works. The machines ordered from England were 
incomplete, operating bellows with cattle power proved ill-conceived, 
buildings were of insufficient dimension, the European workmen arrived a 
year after the machinery did, and ‘adequate arrangement had not been 
made for the provision of fuel.’73 There is no evidence that Porto Novo 
ever employed Indian workers above the most unskilled tasks. Why did it 
not employ Indians in supervisory positions? The answer is obvious. 
Given the character of indigenous smelting in the interior regions, it would 
be difficult for the owner of a 4000 tons furnace to contemplate making 
use of smelters practiced to operate two-ton makeshift furnaces. 
Transportation of wood fuel was a huge problem in this region that 
still did not have either good roads or railways. The ores would have to be 
transported from Salem by rivers and canals, which were navigable for 
about six months in the year. A small canal used by the factory to 
transport charcoal dried up.74 In a further blow to the prospects of the 
works, the workshop did not have, and despite tortuous negotiations over 
a decade, failed to establish, undisputed property rights over resources. 
The Board of Revenue asserted the rights of the people to the common 
forest lands in the region, including the right to collect wood and ore.75 
The Collector of Salem stated that ‘the hundreds of native furnaces at 
work’ in his jurisdiction were already able to provide ‘any quantity of iron 
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required by the people’; that ‘very many make their livelihood by burning 
charcoal and bringing it for sale to the iron smiths’, and it was his duty to 
protect these livelihoods.76 India after all was not a New World colony 
where the settlers could write their own laws. On the contrary, natural 
resources such as wood, water, and iron were entangled in complicated 
customary rights, which some officers of the government felt it their duty 
to protect. 
A  third contemporary venture on which some information is 
available is the Kumaon Iron Works, which was formally launched in 
1856. It had been officially known for at least thirty years before this date 
that Kumaon had indigenous smelting, ore, and plenty of wood fuel. In 
1856, the Government considered production of charcoal iron with the 
help of private capital. It appears that two small smelting workshops 
under government supervision had already been working in this area. 
Two private agents, Davis and Co. and one Drummond, took over these 
two workshops. These two firms merged in 1862 to form North of India 
Kumaon Iron Works Company (Limited). The enterprise had its eyes on 
potential demand for iron from the railways. But it faced an 
insurmountable obstacle transporting and accessing wood. Proposal for a 
light railway to connect the ore region with the nearest major railhead did 
not materialize until 1864, when the factory was abandoned. Kumaon was 
rapidly emerging as a major potential source of timber. In the two years of 
its existence, an elaborate licensing contract was drawn between the 
company and the Government, which added stringent and in some views 
impractical clauses on regeneration of forests. The opportunity cost of 
charcoal, therefore, killed the idea. In 1876, the Government again tried to 
attract private capital, to no success.77 
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Historians of the iron industry have paid particular attention to a 
series of experiments conducted in Birbhum.78 In this region, between 
1770 and 1870, licenses to mine and/or produce iron in large furnaces 
were procured, more or less in that order, by one Indranarayan Sharma, 
Messrs Mott and Farquhar, several neo-zamindars of whom 
Baishnabcharan Hajra was the most prominent name, and the Birbhum 
Iron Works Company set up by Messrs Mackay and Company of 
Calcutta. The identity of some of these individuals remains obscure. The 
first of these ventures never began; the second fought exhausting battles 
with the principal zamindari in Birbhum over rent and with the local 
smelters over access to material before giving up; Hajra was engaged in 
a protracted lawsuit with one Madangopal Basu, who had purchased a 
piece of the now splintered Birbhum raj; and the fourth declined due to 
competition of cheaper imported iron and increasing cost of transporting 
wood fuel as forests receded rapidly from the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The correspondence of the Mackay and Company 
contains the hint that the owners had spent an enormous amount of 
money hiring workers who, they felt, were dangerously prone to 
drunkenness. In response to this problem, the company lobbied to ban 
production of spirit in the neighbourhood of the works.79 
The examples establish that European enterprise in India failed 
because of a persistent underestimation of input costs, both measureable 
direct costs and transaction costs. It faced high energy cost, for wood fuel 
was costly to transport in regions that did not have many navigable rivers. 
The European work-force often proved unreliable and inexperienced. 
Property rights and rights to the commons were not to the advantage of a 
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factory. And given that these works failed to make a convincing attempt to 
address these problems, the government was only a half-hearted partner 
in these ventures. Finally, there was a misperception of demand. These 
enterprises understood the colonial market consisting of the army, public 
construction, and the railways, and thought a promise to supply these 
markets would enable them to get concessionary licenses on ore, wood, 
and market. The colonial market was an unreliable partner, however. 
Porto Novo made an attempt to sell an iron plough to peasants, but too 
late and too hesitantly to make any difference to its profitability.80 
As we move on to the end of the nineteenth century, Indo-
European enterprise in iron had begun locating themselves in easy 
proximity of railway lines that served mining tracts. And they had switched 
to the reverberatory furnace and coking coal, though some of the early 
enterprises in coke-furnaces continued to be troubled by the quality of 
coal.81 The Tatas issued their prospectus in 1907, having once before 
abandoned a plan to set up a mill in Chanda. These new proposals 
contemplated not only much larger scale of operation, but also integration 
of manufactures, coal washery, labour barracks, township building, and 
mining, a technological model that had better prospect of succeeding, 
provided enough capital and marketing support were available. 
 If the smelting story shows why import substitution was so difficult, 
the blacksmith story shows how knowledge transactions could facilitate 
import substitution. 
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Blacksmiths 
The first inkling we have that the blacksmith story may be quite a 
different one comes from wages data. Between 1870 and 1930, the 
average earnings of skilled urban artisans including blacksmiths 
increased about three and a half times, stayed above the average 
earnings of mill workers, were consistently higher than the wages of rural 
labourers, and the gap was increasing.82 It was not the case that 
business failures were rare among the skilled urban blacksmith, but case
of lost markets were more than matched by new opportunities. There was
also more differentiation within the blacksmith community, one end of it 
being engaged in meeting rural demand and another supplying urban 
demand. The latter group especially came in systematic contact with 
European consumption and imported tools and tec
s 
 
hniques. 
                                           
In this section, I explore one specific ingredient in the improvement 
in productivity in this sphere, Indo-European collaboration and knowledge 
spillover. The five major channels of knowledge transfer in which I classify 
the available evidence are, following a roughly chronological order: early 
modern coastal trade; European firms in early nineteenth century colonial 
port cities; military engineers located in the interior of the country; Indian 
blacksmiths manufacturing small consumption articles for the city market; 
and technical schools and government factories at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. 
The history of technological transaction in iron goods goes back to 
the beginning of settlement of European traders on the Indian coast. A 
description of Indian ship-building on the western coast in the eighteenth 
century remarked that ‘their anchors are mostly European, our iron being 
much better, and better worked.’83 There is considerable evidence that, 
even though casting was not a well-developed indigenous industry, a 
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great deal of ship anchors were being cast in ports using indigenous iron 
and ironsmiths working under European direction and custom. In the 
seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company set up iron works 
near Palakole on the southwestern coast.84 The works possibly contained 
a foundry, employed Indian blacksmiths, and represented a different 
technological paradigm in shipping, one that employed a great deal more 
iron than did the Indian ships. Thomas Bowrey, the English merchant who 
lived in Bengal in the 1670s, observed that the works employed ‘Several 
black Smiths, makeinge all Sorts of iron worke, (necessarie for Ships) 
whereby they doe Supply most of theire fleets with Such Necessaries’. 
The ‘necessaries’ included ‘speeks’, bolts, and anchors. Apart from iron 
parts, the cluster also produced rope and twine for the riggings, and had 
master ship-builders, ‘who have most of their dependencies Upon the 
English, and indeed learnt their art and trade from some of them, by 
diligently Observinge the ingenuitie of Some that build Ships and Sloops 
here for the English East India Company and theire Agents..’.85 Bowrey 
complained of their ‘falseheartedness’, at having learnt from the English 
and yet working for the Dutch. Read in a more positive light, the 
description hinted at an active labour market for skills. A slightly later 
source mentioned casting of anchors for ships, though ‘not so good as 
those made in Europe’.86 These works were located near Balasore, 
where the English and the Dutch had trading stations before moving up 
north. One authority on iron considers that the presence of many larger-
scale iron smelting workshops in Kathiawad, and near Masulipatnam, 
were a legacy of the European enterprise connected with ship-building.87 
                                           
After the Company received the dewanny of Bengal, Bihar and 
Orissa, cannons became a major item of import into India. Attempts to 
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substitute imports were sponsored by the importers themselves. A 
cannon foundry was proposed in 1768 to be erected inside the Fort 
William, a short time after slightly worried Company officers saw a similar 
enterprise run by the Nawab of Awadh. Ten years later, a whole blast 
furnace was contracted, but not delivered, for the use of the Fort William 
foundry.88 In the eighteenth century again, Indian princes who had come 
in close contact with British enterprise and society, the Nawabs of 
Carnatic and Awadh for example, purchased a great deal of high-bulk 
prefabricated European iron goods, and sometimes had them made 
locally. Founding cannons with European help was a popular 
preoccupation of the regional princes in this time. The Chief Engineer of 
Fort William, a Col. Polier, who was also an inspiration to James Rennell 
on cartography, took up employment with the Awadh state.89 The 
Carmelite priest Paolino da San Bartolemeo wrote that in the 1770s ‘the 
king of Travancor purchases Every year, from the Europeans, iron, 
cannon, and cloth for the use of his soldiers’.90 San Bartolemeo also 
wrote that there was a garrison of European soldiers in the same place 
where the arsenal of the Travancore king was located, and made a 
special note of the ‘cannon foundery’ that the garrison contained.91 
Cannons were not the only end-use of a foundry. In the eighteenth 
century in Calcutta, the afore-mentioned Kyd’s docks on Hooghly 
produced boats that were familiar on the southeastern coast in the early 
nineteenth century, and further south, a point of anchorage called 
Gloucester, later Gloster, possessed a ship-building yard that later 
converted into a cotton factory and a distillery.92 It can be presumed that 
both these works contained foundries. James Kyd was an illegitimate son 
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of Robert Kyd (1746-93), engineer in the army, and the founder of the 
botanical gardens of Calcutta. According to one myth, James was the 
origin of the name Kidderpore, where his docks were located. The same 
site had an even older dockyard belonging to Henry Watson, who 
became bankrupt. On the opposite shore, in a mud fort a cannon foundry 
was reportedly in existence in the eighteenth century.93 
The nineteenth century began with a rapid increase in the import of 
iron goods into India. The evidence of Charles Atkinson, the Mayor of 
Sheffield, and Robert Jackson, Master Cutler, recorded before a 
Parliamentary Committee in 1859 contains general information of the 
early nineteenth century English exports to India.94 With the end of the 
East India Company monopoly trading rights, the scale of business 
between India and Sheffield grew rapidly. The main articles of export 
were ‘cutlery, tools of all kinds, more particularly tools for joiners’ and 
carpenters’ purposes, files and saws, steel, and latterly steel springs for 
railway purposes .. and hardware generally.’ 
Interestingly, other than cutlery, many of the products mentioned in 
this list were tools of trade for the carpenter and the blacksmith. 
Blacksmiths were sufficiently common among the European population of 
Calcutta, and more rarely, north India. One of them came in accidental 
contact with Bishop Heber of Calcutta, on his travels near Allahabad in 
1824.95 The generic carriage workshops of Calcutta saw a joining of 
European enterprise with Indian skilled labour, both carpenters and 
blacksmiths. Cutlery had been imported into India in the early-1800s, and 
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yet, a change was visible. ‘I have seen articles of cutlery and even brass 
instruments made in very considerable perfection; the latter was at the 
gun carriage yard, in Seringapatam, where European superintendents 
have instructed some of the half-cast artisans and natives to be very 
skilful workmen’.96 The gun-carriage workshop in Madras that provided 
material for bridges and military purposes was ‘simply a big workshop 
where all the common tools used by smiths are employed’, and there 
were several other such workshops in Madras in 1840.97 Indian workmen 
worked in considerable numbers in the arsenals, as we have seen, and 
the Mint at Calcutta, where their skill in cutting the dies, turning lathe, and 
rolling copper into sheets ‘with equal facility as if performed by the best 
European workmen’ impressed David Smith, the Government Iron and 
Coal Viewer, in 1856. Smith also felt that without a change of food and 
dress, the weakly built ‘Bengalee’ would not be able to stand the heat and 
the hard work of the puddling or the rolling mills of average scale then 
usual in Britain.98 
A travelogue published in 1837 contains a detailed description of 
Monghyr in Bihar, the erstwhile capital of Bengal, where a large number 
of manufactories produced a great variety of durable goods. The concept 
of many of these goods had come from Europe, but the manufacturing 
process and the skills derived from indigenous workmanship.99 Some of 
these goods met new consumption and were manufactured ‘under the 
inspection of persons well ancquanited with these arts’. The most famous 
branch of such hybrid enterprise consisted of arms.Foremost among ‘the 
vast number of new articles’ found in Monghyr in the 1830s were double-
barelled guns and rifles. The ‘blacksmiths, who work up steel and iron into 
                                            
96 Affairs of the East India Company, evidence of John Malcolm, p. 4. 
97 B.P.P. 1852-53 (634), Despatches, Minutes and Reports, evidence of Captain J. 
Campbell, p. 384. 
98 India Office Records, IOR/V/27/610/15. 
99 Roberts, Scenes and characteristics of Hindostan, vol. 1, pp. 296-8 
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a great variety of forms’ hailed from an indigenous tradition already 
making ‘the best kind .. of spears’. But their workmanship was easily 
adaptable, and they promised to be ‘easily trained .. in any mechanical 
employment.’ This source on Monghyr expressly mentioned the absence 
of European owned workshop in the town, even though the buyers of 
these goods, who included many Europeans, sometimes ntervened in the 
design of the goods. This pattern did not change radically in the ninteenth 
century. Blacksmiths continued to be predominantly Indians. But a few 
significant exceptions can be found. 
A somewhat well-recorded Indo-European enterprise was the firm 
of James Petrie, a cotton ginner in Coimbatore. His experience points at a 
few general features of skill transfer in machine-using industries.100 
Manufacturing had become more complex and more mechanized 
between 1814 and 1847, and by the latter date, some manufacturers 
needed to hire local hands to fabricate and repair machinery. Usually, 
carpenters and blacksmiths performed such tasks. Learning did not pose 
any obstacle. ‘In a very short time, almost an incredibly short time, they 
learnt to make up the machines which I required.’ But learning also 
occurred on the blacksmiths’ own terms. There was no wholesale 
substitution of English practice for Indian practice; rather, Indian artisans 
combined old and new tools, traditional and new modes of working. 
Indian carpenters typically worked with few metal tools, a chisel, a plane, 
and an axe at the most, all of which they used flexibly for a variety of 
purposes. Blacksmiths worked individually with small bellows and 
hammers, often setting themselves up under the shade of a tree, sitting 
down unlike the European forge-shop workers who worked standing up. 
‘These modes of working did not answer my purpose’. Petrie imported 
large bellows, anvils, vices, and turning lathes from the ordnance factory 
at Madras. When set to work ‘in European fashion’, the blacksmiths 
                                            
100 B.P.P. 1847-48 (511), Select Committee on Growth of Cotton, pp. 178-9. 
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surprised him. They rearranged the tools to be able to sit down and work 
them, and dispensed with the vice which the Indian blacksmith rarely 
used. Whenever Petrie paid visits to the work-space, they stood up to 
reassure him. After a few such occasions, Petrie did not press the issue. 
Either way, they produced work of a sufficient quality for the owner to 
declare, ‘I think they are as easily learnt as a similar class of men in 
England would be that had never seen such work before.’101  
 Military campaigns had placed contingents of soldiers in territories 
that did not have good roads and bridges. In two examples from the 
second third of the nineteenth century, both occurring in a region rich in 
iron ore and yet distant from the port cities where skilled labourers were 
available, we see an attempt by military engineers to recruit local artisans 
for a large scale construction work. Before Nagpur became the 
intersection point of the north-south and east-west transportation routes, 
Jubbulpore held that position of importance. Goods and people from the 
Hyderabad region travelled north via Chhindwara, Narsinghpur, and 
Jubbulpore en route to Sagar. On this route, a stream that became 
impassable in the monsoons was forded by an iron suspension bridge c. 
1830 by one Colonel Pesgrave posted in this territory.102 There was no 
European settlement and few foremen in Pesgrave’s team. It is not known 
if any member of the team possessed direct knowledge of either bridge-
building or iron-making. Nevertheless, they gathered together a number 
of blacksmiths and smelters from the countryside. Such people were 
drawn by word of mouth, curiosity, and a prospect of wage work. Bit by 
bit, the links were constructed, put together, carried over the river and put 
in place. In Punasa jail in Nimar, again in central India, Lieutenant R.H. 
                                            
101 The posture of the workmen posed a similar problem with carpenters working in the 
railway workshop of Lahore, Medley, India and Indian Engineering, p. 59. 
102 This person was possibly the same Col. D. Pesgrave who contributed an article in 
the proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (in 1835) on how to protect the piano 
forte from the adverse effects of Indian climate by fitting an iron rod to the frame. 
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Keatinge installed an indigenous process of iron manufacture shortly 
before the Mutiny, with the help of jail labour. The works contained a 
heavy tilt hammer to refine the crude iron. He was about to set up a 
rolling mill when the Mutiny broke out and he was called away.103 
Reports of such Indo-European enterprises begin to become 
scarcer after 1857. A different kind of relocation of skill begins to draw 
more attention thereafter, a shift of capital and enterprise away from the 
country blacksmith tied to the smelting communities, towards urban 
smithy and town markets. Whereas the former world remained trapped in 
nearly stagnant consumption, the urban world saw significant growth in 
the market for cutlery, industrial tools, railway rolling stock, bridge-
building, and arsenal. An 1830s description from Bihar observed the 
division between the country blacksmith and the blacksmiths of Patna or 
Munger.104 The former were blacksmiths engaged in producing 
agricultural implements, who ‘usually belong to the manorial 
establishment, and the payments for the implements of agriculture arises 
from a share of the crop.’ The latter were more specialized in iron, and 
manufactured a variety of goods, ‘vessels for boiling sugar and 
sweetmeats, the drums called nakarah, nails, locks and chest hinges, and 
more rarely bird cages and horseshoes’. Their earnings were double the 
average that obtained in the village. Imported goods and domestic 
production supplied that market jointly, with the latter’s share possibly 
increasing. In Bundelkhand likewise, village blacksmiths joined the urban 
foundries and forges. They had to be retrained, for they needed to know 
the ways of handling coal furnaces that worked on higher temperatures. 
They had to be trained on ‘accuracy’ and working to customized 
                                            
103 India Office Records, IOR/V/27/612/9. 
104 Martin, History, Antiquities, Topography, and Statistics of Eastern India, p. 343. 
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dimensions. These were matters of importance when the blacksmith 
supplied machine parts rather than agricultural tools.105 
In the Narmada valley in central India, ‘when iron came to be 
imported on a large scale, the wealthier Lohars found that it suited them 
to make use of the foreign material, which, though it might be more 
expensive, was in a more convenient form. .. They thus naturally drifted to 
the larger towns, where the imported material was more readily 
obtainable and the field of custom wider.’106 Imported bar iron was at first 
preferred for the convenient shape rather than the low cost, but 
increasingly also preferred for the cost. By 1900, in towns located in 
prosperous agricultural tracts (such as Hoshangabad), the urban 
blacksmith belonged in ‘a substantial and prosperous class’.107 A slightly 
different case of skill development through making new goods using new 
materials occurred in the sphere of production of matchlocks in Bihar. In 
Monghyr in the mid-Gangetic plains and in Dhampur and Nagina in the 
Himalayan foothills, matchlocks were made with or without official 
sanction in the mid-nineteenth century, as we have seen. ‘The ability of 
the clever lohars is strikingly shown in their power of copying good 
European firearms of the modern type.’108 This industry often employed 
designers, polishers, and wire-drawers to decorate the barrels of the guns 
or other parts. 
A larger field of import substitution occurred in cutlery. With the 
coming of imported English and Swedish iron, a new urban demand for 
cutlery grew rapidly. At the start of the nineteenth century, articles of steel 
in ordinary use, including cutlery, knives and scissors, ‘are generally 
imported from England, being very superior to those manufactured in 
                                            
105 Dobbs, Monograph, pp. 4-5. 
106 Begbie, Monograph, pp. 4-5. 
107 Ibid., p. 58 
108 Dobbs, Monograph, p. 18. 
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India’.109 By 1900, however, cutlery manufacture occurred in nearly all 
larger cities, or within clusters with easy access to transportation. 
Blacksmiths engaged in meeting the new demand required a higher 
degree of skill in the shape of product differentiation than was necessary 
with agricultural implements. It is in this sphere that master artisans could 
be found. ‘This higher class of work is carried out in larger shops and the 
workers are the employés of the master cutler’. Skill commanded a wage 
premium. The average monthly income of Rs. 15 at 1900 placed the 
cutler at the top of the urban wage scale.110 Prem Chand Mistry was the 
owner of a workshop in Kanchannagar, a small locality in the Burdwan 
district of western Bengal that had developed as a concentration of the 
manufacture of iron tools, implements, and cutlery since at least the 
nineteenth century. A government report of 1890 mentioned Mistry’s 
workshop for having successfully introduced a hand-driven lathe.111 
Twenty years later, in another report on Bengal manufactures, ‘the well-
known shop’ of Prem Chand Mistry finds mention again, for having 
introduced oil-engine to drive his lathes.112 In both instances, his 
technological leadership was seen as a model for small-scale metal 
products industry in general. 
At the turn of the century, the labour market opened up to admit 
non-family apprentices. ‘In a typical shop’ making cutlery in the towns of 
Eastern India, ‘the following men were found at work: two owners, 
superintending, finishing and packing, etc.: two men at the forge, and a 
boy to work the bellows: one boy for filing the handles: three men for 
hammering and filing the blades: one man for joining the two portions 
together’113 Such workshops could not follow the practice common in the 
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110 Watson, Monograph, p. 33. 
111 Quoted by Mukharji, Monograph, p. 27. 
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villages of securing labour by means of intra-community cooperation. In 
Bundelkhand towns, there was a shortage of workers, and hereditary 
knowledge was not necessarily an advantage. Employers complained of 
shortage of skilled mechanics, the best being drawn away to Calcutta or 
other larger cities. In industrial towns, therefore, smithy recruited raw 
workers from different caste backgrounds, and a more or less formal 
system of apprenticeship was practiced.114 In the Narmada valley again, 
we observe greater utilization of non-family, if intra-community, 
apprentices.115 Business organization opened up too. Larger workshops 
and partnerships were usual in the cities. It was this state of activity in the 
labour market that explained the rise in blacksmith wages discussed 
earlier. 
The cities also saw a completely new factory industry develop from 
the end of the nineteenth century, operating on European pattern with 
blast furnaces, foundry shops, rolling mills, and mechanical forges. The 
railway construction created an immense new demand for rolling stock, 
rails, sleepers, wires, bars, and rods. This demand encouraged private 
entrepreneurs to start iron-making using coke and rolling mills in Bengal, 
shortly after P.N. Bose’s reports on the deposits of the essential raw 
material in the Bengal-Bihar area became well-known. In the rolling mills 
of Calcutta, all designs and equipment were imported, and so were the 
foremen. The ordnance factory of Calcutta had large metal-working 
                                            
114 ‘Boys are employed on the simpler work at a couple of rupees a month, and their 
pay is gradually increased according to their proficiency. In factories, children under 14 
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useful workmen “trained on the premises”.’ There was, nevertheless, a tension 
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father’s forge or the shop of another Lohar, where they were not paid any wage and 
they did not pay a fee. By the age of 15 they began to work on their own account. 
Begbie, Monograph, p. 58 
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shops, and recruited thousands of workers. Public works and urban 
construction provided impetus to the factory industry. 
An important new field of training was the railway workshops that 
employed both blacksmiths and carpenters in large numbers, often on 
job-work basis. In Bombay in the early twentieth century, ‘Lohars from 
Gujarat were preponderant among the smiths in the wheel shop’, 
whereas the foremen were all Europeans.116 The Roorkee engineering 
college, established in 1848 and later renamed after James Thomason 
who had facilitated the new Grand Trunk Road and the Ganges canal, 
had a foundry, ‘the first of the kind erected in India’. The foundry was 
erected before demand for iron from the railways took off, though the 
resources of the college were closely associated with the construction of 
the Ganges canal. In its origins, the foundry could not have employed 
local workers. But by 1873, not only were the workmen all Indians, ‘they 
will make anything for anybody, from an iron bridge or a steam engine, 
down to a railway key; and they turn out excellent spirit levels, prismatic 
compasses, and so forth’.117 
The principal gun factory of British India, located in Calcutta, 
reported that ‘the labour as recruited is generally quite untrained’. A large 
proportion was migrant Muslims, whereas among the Bengali 
blacksmiths, Muslims had been conspicuously rare. The factory created 
its own system of training workers, and reported a large skill and wage 
differential between the ordinary tool-shop worker and the mechanic.118 
Such differentials reflected the opportunity cost of the mechanic, who left 
‘frequently .. to find employment with private firms’. In other words, a 
hierarchy between the literate class of foremen with formal training, and 
the raw workers, had formed. The situation inside the cotton textile mills 
                                            
116 Chandavarkar, Origins, p. 225. 
117 Medley, India and Indian Engineering, pp. 42-3. 
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of Bombay, where a hierarchy between the Parsi or the European 
supervisors and the workers was in existence, was similar.119 
In these new enterprises and organizations, the world of the 
formally trained Indian engineer, and that of the informally trained Indian 
blacksmith were coming into increasing contact. Civil engineering was 
introduced as a university subject in the 1870s, and drew a sizeable 
number of Indians about 1900. The students in the university degree 
programmes in engineering numbered only a few dozen in 1900 and all 
hailed from ‘the babu class’; that is, the gentry rather than the working 
people. The ‘babu’ graduates usually joined the Public Works 
Department. These programmes had an externality. The civil engineering 
schools had mechanical shops affiliated to them, which recruited men of 
artisanal class as apprentice-cum-workers. There were also, at 1900, 
about half a dozen provincial technical schools in Bengal attached to the 
Calcutta University. These schools offered short courses in machining. In 
this way, a few boys of ‘the mistry class’ received or were exposed to 
formal training, and their number was in all likelihood, growing. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The iron industry in nineteenth century India was transformed by 
the availability of imported goods, tools, and skills. What was the nature 
of the transformation? Did colonialism and globalization aid or obstruct 
industrial development? According to the received view, the outcome was 
a negative one, for imported goods destroyed indigenous industry, and 
                                            
119 The hierarchy inside rolling mills was influenced partly by differences in expected 
daily output of different categories of workers. Ritter von Schwarz’s description of a 
rolling mill in Bengal compares the situation in England and America, where the 
average output of a single-rails rolling mill could go up to 440 tons a day, 600 tons not 
being unknown, with that in Bengal, where the prevailing ‘manual aptitude and practice’ 
made a yield beyond 200 tons unrealistic. India Office Records, IOR/V/27/612/9, pp. 
12-3. It is not altogether clear whether the difference resulted from quality of training or 
the length of the working day. 
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the colonial state distorted and obstructed wide utilization of imported 
tools and skills. In this paper, I argue that factor costs, as distinct from 
political variables, explain the link between technological exchange and 
industrial development better. The outcome of globalization was not 
uniform, but a mixed one, because factor costs were sometimes 
significantly large, and sometimes relatively low. 
To illustrate this proposition, the paper compares the experiences 
of smelting and smithy. Artisan communities producing semi-finished iron 
tended to be located near the ores and worked on a scale and level of 
capability adapted to meeting local rural demand for iron. Production 
costs were relatively high, but the industry was protected by high 
transport cost. Transport costs limited trade, average scale of production, 
and interregional knowledge exchange. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, indigenous smelting entered a crisis. The railways 
reduced transportation costs, and brought markets within easy access of 
cheaper imported goods. Wood fuel began to become scarce, as forests 
were reserved, alternative demands for wood in construction, ship-
building and railways grew, and in some regions, woods ran out. Given its 
dependence on rural markets, artisanal smelting could not possibly 
expand scale, economize, and absorb these costs. European artisans in 
India tried the larger-scale and horizontally integrated factory. The 
physical distance between their targeted market, which was the 
government, and the origin of ores again posed a transport cost problem. 
The one hypothetical advantage they had in conducting enterprises in 
India was cheap labour. But Indian labour was located near the ores, 
usually found working within traditional institutions such as the household, 
and used to operating small-scale units. There was an almost 
unbridgeable distance between Indian labour and European capital. On 
the other hand, skilled labour imported from Britain did not necessarily 
provide a solution. They were often unreliable and inefficient, suggesting 
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that migration of wage-workers from Britain to India in this time suffered 
from an adverse selection problem. And in common with indigenous 
smelting, European smelting had to contend with the rising scarcity of 
wood fuel. 
In contrast with the smelters, many of the specialist blacksmiths 
belonged in urban communities, were more familiar with contractual 
service for a diverse range of clients, closer to consumer markets rather 
than ore supplies, and therefore less susceptible to the adverse effects of 
narrow markets. In this sphere, globalization had a more adaptive effect. 
The only complementary factor necessary to make good use of imported 
tools and ideas was craftsmanship, already available in abundance. 
Retraining needs were not always great and retraining prospects better in 
the towns. Much knowledge was embodied in small tools, which had been 
partly imported, and partly substituted with refashioned local tools. There 
were small economies of scale in smithy; consequently capital cost was 
of little consequence. The city, the ports, the barracks, and the public 
works, allowed a convergence of knowledge to develop between 
European and Indian artisans. Blacksmiths benefited from the 
unconventional communication opportunities provided by these new sites, 
while adapting new knowledge in their own way. European money was 
present in this sphere, but it was not an essential factor; the learning 
process was led by the urban Indian blacksmith. 
The present study of iron, in contrast with previous ones, stresses 
some of the costs of starting large-scale resource-intensive industries in 
mid-nineteenth century India. Could more aggressive state intervention 
reduce these costs? The role of the state in the early nineteenth century 
was evidently minimal, among other reasons because many actors within 
the state machine understood the barriers that private capitalists needed 
to overcome. A new iron factory in 1840 would need to build railways and 
canals, enter protracted negotiations on mining or land acquisition at a 
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time when property rights had been redefined and allocated, wait 
indefinitely for machines to arrive and then have them faultily assembled 
by inebriated poorly trained European foremen, and depend on European 
markets. In the presence of high costs of so many complementary inputs, 
it could not have been easy for a state to play the infant industry game. 
By contrast, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the prospect of 
effective state intervention brightened as the costs of accessing 
machines, material, and manpower declined. Increasingly, the only 
remaining barrier to the success of large-scale enterprise was cost of 
capital. In this scenario, direct market assistance could realistically work, 
and it did work for the Tatas. 
Finally, the iron example carries a lesson on the differential 
prospects that migrant artisans, the channel of knowledge transfer 
stressed in this paper, faced in different regions of the world. The scale of 
settler migration to India was small compared with that of the colonies of 
the north Atlantic. And the scale of net migration (net of emigration from 
India) slowed after Crown rule began. As wage-gap between Britain and 
India widened, and New World migration became a flood, newcomers to 
India needed to be paid a higher wage than their predecessors, a century 
ago, could hope to get. Such expected wages restricted recruitment of 
technical people to a small segment in the formal sector.120 But it would 
be a mistake to compare the two migrations only on scale. They differed 
in qualitative terms. In the north Atlantic, skills were exported as they 
were found in points of origin. India had an established artisan tradition, 
and plentiful indigenous commercial and industrial skills, before 
colonization. Settlers needed to come to terms with this resource. 
                                            
120 Further, as Britain’s own industrial lead began to slacken, India could potentially 
source knowledge and experts from other Atlantic regions, even Japan. The interwar 
period saw evidence of this diversification. 
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Success and failure of foreign enterprise in early-colonial India depended 
on how well or badly the grounds for such collaboration could be created. 
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